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National Solid Wastes Management
Association v. Meyer: The Dormant
Commerce Clause Claims Another
Environmental Victim
ERIC ANTHONY BRAUN*
In National Solid Wastes Managegment Association v. Meyer',
the Seventh Circuit recently held a Wisconsin waste management
scheme invalid2 under the dormant Commerce Clause.3 While the
case generally affirms precedent in this field,4 it also expands the
scope of the dormant Commerce Clause, and creates inconsistencies
as to which level of scrutiny applies to environmental regulation.
The case also calls into question the level of legitimacy environ-
mental regulatory schemes are required to have in order to pass
Constitutional muster.
This Comment examines the case, the scheme the court invali-
dated, and the ramifications the decision creates for state environ-
" Staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW; J.D.,
Class of 1997, University of Kentucky; B.S., Economics, June 1994, Centre College of
Kentucky.
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir.
1995).
2 Id. at 663.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." The Commerce Clause has long been held to have a "dormant" or
"negative" aspect that significantly limits State regulatory powers. Fulton v. Faulkner, 116
S.Ct. 848, 853 (1996) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)). See also
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
4 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S.Ct. 1677 (1994)
(holding a city ordinance requiring all foreign-generated waste to be treated at a waste
transfer station discriminatory under the dormant Commerce Clause); Oregon Waste
Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 114 S.Ct. 1345 (1994)
(holding a discriminatory waste-flow surcharge facially invalid under the dormant Com-
merce Clause); National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dept. of Envi-
ronmental Management, 910 F.2d 713 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (invalidating a law preventing in-
state waste management facilities from accepting foreign, non-approved, non-pretreated
hazardous wastes).
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mental regulation. The Comment first describes the ambitious nature
of Wisconsin's waste management scheme. Part II discusses the
conflict that led to the successful Commerce Clause challenge to the
statute. Part III then provides an analysis of how the decision relates
to the existing body of Commerce Clause decisions. It concludes
with a discussion of the case's effects on Commerce Clause prece-
dent and future state environmental regulation.
I. THE WISCONSIN STATUTE: AN AMBITIOUS ATTEMPT AT
CONTROL OF SOLID WASTE FLOW
The Wisconsin statute involved a comprehensive plan to reduce
the flow of solid waste into Wisconsin landfills.5 The statute ex-
pressly prohibited the deposit of eleven specific items in Wisconsin
landfills, regardless of their origin.6 The prohibited items included
aluminum cans and containers, plastic containers, newsprint, maga-
zine paper, glass containers and tires.7 The statute did, however,
provide an exception to this general prohibition. The ban did not
apply to solid waste "generated in a region that has an effective
recycling program ... and, if the region is not in this state, the
region is located in a state that has an effective siting pro-
gram .... ."' "Effective recycling program" and "effective siting
program" were defined in other parts of the act, thereby providing
specific criteria set up by the Wisconsin legislature. 9 The prohibited
items are ones commonly found in municipal solid waste. Thus, any
"region" that intended to dump solid waste in a Wisconsin landfill
must have first fulfilled the standards set up in the Wisconsin stat-
ute. Regions outside of Wisconsin were required to implement ef-
fective recycling and siting programs to avoid the statutory ban.'0
In order to fulfill the standards of the statute, a region (defined
as a city, county, state, or municipality - referred to in the statute as
a "responsible unit") was required to implement the specifics of
WIS. STAT. § 159.11-12, whether or not it was located within the
state." The region would then have to send a copy of its recycling
plan to the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (Depart-
WIS. STAT. §§ 159.07, 159.11-12 (1994).
6 Id. § 159.07.
7 Id. § 159.07(3).
Id. § 159.07(7).
Id. § 159.11-12.
,o Id. § 159.07(7).
Id. § 159.11.
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ment) for approval or rejection. 2
The Department, using criteria set out in the statute, determined
whether a region had an "effective" recycling or siting program. 3
To be "effective" a region's program had to satisfy each item in a
list of specific requirements set out in the statute. 4 Among the re-
quirements for in-state regions were comprehensive recycling and
post-consumer waste separation programs, as well as laws requiring
land owners of single family residences, apartment buildings with
five or more units, or industrial facilities to provide for separate
containers and collection of the banned items. 5 Furthermore, a pro-
gram would only be "effective" if it also implemented a recycling
education program, provided for collection of the post consumer
waste, and required separation of the banned items from waste that
was not already separated. 16 Out-of-state regions were required to
implement the above requirements in addition to complying with the
recycling policies of their home state. 7
The statute further required the Department to promulgate rules
for comparing out-of-state regions with similar regions within the
state to determine compliance with the statute. 8 Those rules were
to be based on the level of governmental financing regionally avail-
able, the enforcement mechanisms in place, and the actual number
of materials being separated and recycled in the region.'
Out-of-state regions intending to dump solid waste in Wiscon-
sin landfills were also required to have an effective siting program
in place. 0 "Siting" refers to the amount of landfill space available
in a particular state. Wisconsin prohibited its landfills from accept-
ing waste from any state in which the amount of waste generated in
that state in the past four years exceeded the amount of new solid
waste disposal capacity developed during the same period.2
Wisconsin's statutory scheme required its Department of Natu-
2 "Upon request of a responsible unit or an out-of-state unit, the department shall
review documentation of the responsible unit's solid waste management program ...or
the out-of-state unit's solid waste management program and determine whether the pro-
gram is an effective recycling program." Id. § 159.11(1).
" Id. §§ 159.11(l)-(3).
14 Id.
", Id. § 159.11(2).
16 Id.
I7 d. § 159.11(2e).
' Id. § 159.11(2e)(b).
19 Id.
'0 Id. § 159.12(3).
21 id.
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ral Resources to make formal rulings as to whether a region's recy-
cling program met the standards in the statute." Programs that did
not meet the standards were to be banned from utilizing solid waste
landfills located within Wisconsin." The scheme also gave the De-
partment the power to subject regions to further requirements by
promulgating additional rules.24 Thus, any region, whether in Wis-
consin or outside of its borders, without a comprehensive waste
management program as stringent as Wisconsin's was effectively
banned from dumping solid waste within the state.
II. THE CASE: A SUCCESSFUL COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE
Recognizing that the Wisconsin scheme presented significant
obstacles to out-of-state waste-producing units, several sanitation
companies and the National Solid Wastes Management Association
(NSWMA) commenced an action in Federal district court, challeng-
ing the legislation on dormant Commerce Clause grounds. The
district court invalidated two parts of the scheme.26 The court in-
validated the effective siting requirement for out-of-state units, hold-
ing that the requirement facially discriminated against interstate
commerce without any apparent justification.27 It further invalidat-
ed the requirement that Wisconsin's Department approve non-Wis-
consin units via formal ruling.28 However, the district court upheld
the remainder of the scheme, concluding that the administrative
burden of compliance would be limited and that the local benefits
(conservation of landfill capacity and protection of the environment)
would be substantial.29 The court held that those benefits out-
weighed the slight burdens presented to interstate commerce and
that, therefore, the scheme did not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. 0
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the
NSWMA argued that the lower court had erred in applying the
22 See supra note 12.
23 WIS. STAT. § 159.07(7).
2, Id. § 159.11(2)(f),





29 National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir.
1995).
30 Id.
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balancing test to Wisconsin's statute and that the scheme facially
discriminated against interstate commerce and should be invalidated
without further inquiry. 3' The appellate court agreed, and held the
entire scheme invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause.32
The Seventh Circuit first examined the tests used in other Com-
merce Clause litigation.33 It concluded that the Supreme Court has
developed a two-tiered approach with which to analyze these is-
sues.34 The court noted that under the first tier when a statute "di-
rectly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce" it is
generally "struck down without further inquiry." 35The court then
explained that under the second tier, a "state statute will be upheld
'unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits."' 36 This "balancing" test,
the court explained, would only be applied if the statute regulates
evenhandedly and "has only indirect or incidental effects on inter-
state commerce .....37
Focusing on what it determined to be direct "extraterritorial"
effects,38 the Seventh Circuit applied several levels of scrutiny to
the statute and ultimately held it invalid.39 The court explained its
decision:
all persons in [a] non-Wisconsin community must adhere to the
Wisconsin standards whether or not they dump their waste in
Wisconsin. If the out-of-state community does not conform to the
Wisconsin way of doing things, no waste generator in that com-
munity may utilize a Wisconsin disposal site.... The practical
impact of the Wisconsin statute on economic activity completely
outside the state reveals its basic infirmity: It essentially controls
the conduct of those engaged in commerce occurring wholly out-
side the State of Wisconsin and therefore directly regulates inter-
state commerce.40
31 Id.
32 Id. at 662.
11 Id. at 657.
3, "The Supreme Court has adopted what amounts to a two-tiered approach to
analyzing state economic regulation under the Commerce Clause." National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 1995).
" Id. at 657.
'6 Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)).
37 Id.
3" The Court noted that it was "not the first circuit to be confronted with the
problem of extraterritoriality in the context of waste regulation." Id. at 660.
" National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 661 (7th Cir.
1995).
I d. at 658 (emphasis added).
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Not only did the court consider extraterritorial effects to be a
direct regulation under the commerce clause, it also considered laws
which have the unintended effect of regulating extraterritorially to
be both direct regulations and discrimination in interstate commerce.
This analysis seems to extend the doctrine of extraterritoriality,
expands the use of the dormant Commerce Clause41, and reflects
indifference to states' legitimate attempts to regulate environmental
concerns. The validity of the holding is discussed in part III below.
First, it is important to understand the scope of the case holdings in
order to appreciate the discussion.
After making the sweeping statement above, the court ex-
plained several U.S. Supreme Court cases which held that state
legislation with extraterritorial reach is unconstitutional.42 The court
analyzed extraterritorial reach in terms of a direct regulatory effect
on interstate commerce. Holding that extraterritorial effect is essen-
tially one example of how a state can directly regulate interstate
commerce,43 the court struck down the Wisconsin law. Clearly,
once the court invalidated the statute under "direct effect" strict
scrutiny, no further analysis was required. However, the court did
not limit its holding to strict scrutiny."
4' See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
42 Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (holding a Connecticut liquor
pricing scheme unconstitutional due to extraterritorial reach); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (striking a New York milk pricing statute that eliminated
competitive advantage of milk distributors in Vermont); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624 (1982) (invalidating an Illinois law allowing Secretary of State authority to hold
hearings regarding fairness of takeover bids offered to partly-owned Illinois corporations).
" "We believe ... the Wisconsin statute seeks to force Wisconsin's judgment
with respect to solid waste recycling on communities in its sister states 'at the pain of
an absolute ban on the flow of interstate commerce."' National Solid Wastes Manage-
ment Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 660-661 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hardage v. Atkins,
619 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1980)).
" It is unclear whether "strict scrutiny" is the proper terminology to use to iden-
tify the court's analysis in this instance. The U.S. Supreme Court avoids using the words
"strict scrutiny" in dormant commerce clause cases, using instead the terminology "rigor-
ous scrutiny" or "heightened scrutiny." See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc., v. Town of
Clarkstown, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994) ("Discrimination against interstate com-
merce ...is per se invalid [unless the state] can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny,
that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest") (emphasis added).
However, it is clear that the Supreme Court employs a "virtually per se rule of invalidi-
ty" which looks very much like strict scrutiny when evaluating allegedly discriminatory
state regulations. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471
(1981); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). Many of the lower
Circuit and District Courts use the words "strict scrutiny" when referring to the same
rule. See Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788, 798 (3rd Cir.
1995) ("[Ihe entire line of recent Supreme Court cases have clarified that either [dis-
[VOL. 1 1: 1
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The court went on to analyze the statute under the various
alternative approaches, finding that even if it did not facially dis-
criminate against interstate commerce, that it would still be subject
to a heightened scrutiny standard.45 The court reasoned that the
statute, in practical application, had an effect on interstate commerce
and "could also be analyzed as working a discrimination on inter-
state commerce." 4 The court noted that, under the heightened scru-
tiny standard, "the state is required to demonstrate that its concerns
'cannot be adequately served by nondiscriminatory alternatives."'47
The court concluded that Wisconsin could easily implement an
alternative method of separating out the eleven banned items.' The
court supported this finding by noting that the legislature had even
provided waste producers with an alternative in the statute by allow-
ing non-effective units an exemption if their waste was sorted at a
waste recovery facility prior to being brought into the state.49 Be-
cause the Court found that nondiscriminatory alternatives existed, it
declared the statute unconstitutional.
Finally, the court analyzed the statute a third time5', now un-
der the Pike balancing test." Relying on its own determination that
criminatory] purpose or effect will trigger strict scrutiny analysis") (emphasis added);
Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a statute
with discriminatory purpose or effect "is subject to strict scrutiny"); Barker Bros. Waste,
Inc. v. Dyer County Legislative Body, No. 95-2942-GA, 1996 WL 163761 (W.D.Tenn.)
(holding that discriminatory regulations are subject to the "strictest scrutiny"). It is also
clear that the Meyer court employed three distinct tests in carrying out its analysis, and
that the first of the tests was the "virtual per se rule of invalidity." Meyer, 63 F.3d 652,
657. Thus, for ease of reference, the first set of tests will be referred to hereinafter as
"strict scrutiny."
41 Id. at 661.
' "Although we have characterized the Wisconsin statute as impermissibly regulat-
ing directly interstate commerce, we note that the practical effect of the statute could
also be analyzed as working a discrimination on interstate commerce." Id. (emphasis
added).
47 Id.
" Id. at 662.
49
The solid waste legislation itself makes clear that there is an available, less
discriminatory alternative that could serve the State's purpose just as well
as the requirement that the entire community follow the dictates of
Wisconsin's plan. Specifically . . . if the waste is processed by a materials
recovery facility that separates the eleven listed materials, the waste will
conform to the environmental needs of Wisconsin.
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 662 (7th Cir. 1995).
'0 Id. at 663.
"' "Where a statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
Wisconsin could easily use other alternatives to pursue its environ-
mental goals, the court held that Wisconsin's need for environmen-
tal regulation, though substantial, was not enough to overcome the
burden that it placed on commerce with neighboring states.52 Thus,
the court invalidated the scheme under every Commerce Clause test
available.
III. MEYER: A CONSISTENT HOLDING WITH TROUBLING
RAMIFICATIONS
At first blush, the holding in National Solid Wastes Manage-
ment Association v. Meyer seems to be consistent with a long line
of Commerce Clause precedent." However, upon closer examina-
tion, the decision yields some perplexing inconsistencies. First, it is
unclear which level of scrutiny would apply to other similar legisla-
tion given the court's reliance on all three tests. Secondly, because
the court analyzed Wisconsin's scheme under three different tests, it
is unclear whether the court tried to limit the dormant Commerce
Clause analysis in this arena to a "two-tiered" approach as it sug-
gested,54 and whether extraterritoriality has emerged as a separate
and distinct test. Finally, the holding raises the issue of how much
legitimacy courts are willing to afford environmental concerns under
Commerce Clause analysis. For purposes of discussion, it is impor-
tant to know the background of existing case law in this area in
order to understand the nuances of Meyer.
A. Waste Management Control Legislation: Which level of Scruti-
ny Applies?
In Meyer, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals quoted the
Supreme Court to support the proposition that the "'critical
consideration' in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny is the
'overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate activity. '
putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
' Meyer, 63 F.3d at 663.
3 See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114
S.Ct. 1677 (1994).
See supra note 34.
5 National Wastes Management Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573
(1986)).
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Clearly, courts are given a significant degree of leeway in deciding
not only which Commerce Clause test will apply, but also whether,
under the test selected, the state's activities are too burdensome. 6
In a time where states are recognizing both an increasing need
and desire to regulate flow of solid waste into their landfills, such
an amorphous standard is disconcerting. How much regulation will
be allowed? Will the court even consider the needs and desires of
the state regarding its own environmental condition? In many cases,
such as Meyer, these questions go unanswered until the court con-
ducts its own post hoc examination of the statute in question. Un-
fortunately, the courts often conduct that examination with the assis-
tance of plaintiffs who are opposed to environmental regulation
because of their own economic interests. 7
After examining past Supreme Court Commerce Clause deci-
sions, one might come to the conclusion that a simple categorical
answer could be given to the states when they express the above
concerns: if the attempted regulation even retains a scent of inter-
state tampering or protectionism, the court will strike it down. 8
However, as with any question of law, categorical answers are un-
avoidably too simplistic. Thus, all categorical answers aside, for
states intending to regulate the flow of solid waste into their land-
fills, the real issue boils down to which level of scrutiny a court
might apply -or at least purport to apply- in carrying out its
evaluation.59
Meyer confuses the scrutiny issue to some degree. In Meyer,
the court did not simply examine the statute and then, based upon
' This conclusion grows out of the fact that the Meyer court applied a variety of
Commerce Clause tests in this case. Also, given the relative youth of the Wisconsin
statute at the time of the case, it must follow that commercial burdens considered by the
court were at least partly based on judicial conjecture.
" For example, the court pointed out in this case that the parties challenging
Wisconsin's law were operators of landfills within the state. Obviously, those businesses
rely heavily on waste coming in from outside of the state for both a source of revenues
as well as competition to bid-up the price of disposing waste in their landfills. Thus,
Wisconsin's law posed a significant economic threat to them in this situation.
"' See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986) (arguing that
the Court always focuses on protectionist purpose and effect, with the result often being
the law is declared unconstitutional) [hereinafter Regan].
" Whatever "test" the Court decides to use may rarely even make a difference.
Regan argues that the various tests, especially the "balancing test," do not properly
characterize the analysis which the Court might carry out in a given case. For example,
after explaining the supposed "balancing" undertaken in Pike, Regan submits that the
opinion "is not a balancing opinion." Id. at 1220.
1995-96]
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that examination, choose one level of scrutiny to apply. Rather, the
court applied all three levels of scrutiny, presumably to protect itself
from relitigation in the event of reversal.' Arguably, the court sim-
ply applied strict scrutiny after first holding that Wisconsin's statute
"controls the conduct of those engaged in commerce occurring
wholly outside the State of Wisconsin and therefore directly regu-
lates interstate commerce." ' That language suggests that because
the statute "directly" regulated interstate commerce, the court struck
it down via strict scrutiny "without further inquiry." However, that
was not the end of the court's analysis.
The court first attempted to establish that a law that has any
extraterritorial effect directly regulates interstate commerce." Next,
the court evaluated the statue in terms of its practical effect on
interstate commerce. The court then inquired into the statute in
terms of adequate state alternatives,63 which shows that the court
affirmatively made "further inquiry" before invalidating the law.
The court then applied the Pike balancing test, an analysis that
applies only if the statute either has no direct effect on interstate
commerce, or has merely "incidental" effects.' Thus, the argument
that the court simply applied strict scrutiny becomes unconvincing.
Moreover, the assertion that a given law will fall to the Commerce
Clause if it has even a hint of impact on interstate commerce be-
comes more believable. Wisconsin was simply left with no alterna-
tive means of regulation. Therefore, states intending to regulate the
flow of solid waste into their landfills are left with little hope of
success, no matter how clever or legitimate their attempts.
0 "[I]f it were necessary to reach the issue (or if our earlier characterizations of
the Wisconsin scheme as discriminatory and a direct regulation of interstate commerce
were found to be erroneous), the Wisconsin scheme still could not past muster under the
test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc ... " Meyer, 63 F.3d at 663.
61 Id. at 658.
62 Id.
63 Id. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Supra, note 51.
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B. Did the Court Apply a Two-Tiered Approach? Under Which
Tier Does "Extraterritoriality" Fit?
In its decision in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
65
the Supreme Court showed its propensity to subject regulation pred-
icated on environmental concerns to a "two-tiered" analysis.' "If a
state law purporting to promote environmental purposes is in reality
'simple economic protectionism,"' the Court explained, "we have
applied a 'virtually per se rule of invalidity."'67 On the other hand,
the Court stated that if a state law regulates "'evenhandedly,' and
imposes only 'incidental' burdens on interstate commerce, the courts
must nevertheless strike it down if 'the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits."' The latter balancing test originated in the Supreme Court
case of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.'
In Meyer, the Seventh Circuit seemed to follow suit. It noted
that "[t]he Supreme Court has adopted what amounts to a two-tiered
approach to analyzing state economic regulation under the Com-
merce Clause."70 Meyer is a perfect example of how that two-tiered
analysis can become muddled and yield inconsistent results.
Presumably, if the court's characterization of a two-tiered anal-
ysis rings true, then courts in general would have the strict scrutiny
and balancing tests described by the Court in Clover Leaf Creamery
at their disposal. However, the analysis is not that simple. Other
related tests and criteria often enter the analysis, which do not al-
ways fit under the rubrics of "strict scrutiny" or "balancing." Those
other tests often are more appropriately deemed "heightened scruti-
ny. 71
For example, the Meyer court used this heightened battery of
tests to evaluate the Wisconsin statute after it had already declared it
449 U.S. 456 (1981) (upholding a Minnesota law prohibiting the sale of milk in
plastic nonrefillable, nonreturnable containers under the Pike balancing test).
66 id.
67 Id. at 471.
66 Id.
' In Pike, the Court dealt with an Arizona law forcing cantaloupe growers to
package their cantaloupes uniformly for shipment to California. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). See
supra, note 51.
'0 National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir.
1995).
" For example, in Meyer the court noted that "[b]ecause Wisconsin's effective
recycling program legislation "discriminate[s] in practical effect against interstate com-
merce, [it is] subject to the higher level of scrutiny ..." Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
1995-96]
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invalid as a direct regulation of interstate commerce. This second
step in its analysis seems to fall under a second prong of the first
tier of strict scrutiny. In Meyer, the court stated that, "[b]ecause
Wisconsin's effective recycling program legislation 'discriminate[s]
in practical effect against interstate commerce, [it is] subject to the
higher level of scrutiny,' and the State is required to demonstrate
that its concerns 'cannot be adequately served by nondiscriminatory
alternatives.' ,
72
One can assume that "the higher level of scrutiny" is one that
is more difficult to satisfy relative to the balancing test, but that the
court will at least conduct a further inquiry before summarily re-
jecting the statute. In other words, the court's second step was to
apply something other than strict scrutiny. Thus, it appears that the
court applied a three-tiered rather than a two-tiered type of analysis.
In addition, the Meyer court's analysis is generally consistent with
the way in which other courts, including the Supreme Court, analyze
legislation of this type." A long line of cases espouse this "two-
tiered" test,74 while bringing the various levels of scrutiny out of
their respective hiding places whenever they are needed. The impor-
tant thing to note about Meyer is that the analyses are very often
inconsistent. That is, while the result is often consistent, the law is
declared invalid, courts arrive at the results in very different ways.
Courts will use the different tests and give the aspects of each dif-
ferent weight. In addition, Meyer does not focus on one test or its
peripheral additions, but rather bends over backwards to insure that
the statute fails every test under the Commerce Clause. Such a
prospect can be daunting for a state that intends to obtain a reason-
able hold on its environment.
Meyer also relied heavily on the extraterritorial aspects of the
Wisconsin statute.75 As the opinion makes clear, just exactly how
extraterritoriality fits into the analysis is not settled. The Seventh
Circuit went out of its way to establish that if a statute effects com-
merce taking place wholly outside the legislating state, then that
alone is an example of a direct regulation of interstate commerce.76
Id. (emphasis added).
See supra note 42.
14 For an example of one of the most recent employments of the two-tiered test,
see C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S.Ct. 1677 (1994) (invalidating
an ordinance requiring all solid waste brought into the city to be handled at a transfer
station).
"5 Meyer, 63 F.3d at 659.
76 id.
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The court cited several Supreme Court cases in which the Court
struck down pricing control statutes," as well as cases from other
circuits to support its argument.78 The court explained that those
cases "establish that the Commerce Clause constrains a state from
projecting its economic legislation onto commerce wholly occurring
in its sister states.,
79
In addition to its direct effect reasoning, the court repeatedly
stated that under its analysis, "[t]he practical effect of the Wisconsin
legislation is to impose the requirements of Wisconsin law on nu-
merous waste generators who neither reside, nor dispose of their
waste in Wisconsin .... , That practical extraterritorial effect, in
the court's collective mind, was enough to make the law invalid
under the heightened scrutiny analysis. The court held that because
the law had extraterritorial effect it was per se invalid." Addition-
ally, the court held that, because the law had a practical extraterrito-
rial effect, the law also had the practical effect of regulating inter-
state commerce. In order to come to that conclusion, the Seventh
Circuit relied on the Court's language in Healy v. Beer Institute.2
The above duality is important because the Court created an-
other powerful tool with which other courts can invalidate state
legislation under the dormant Commerce Clause. Not only is it now
possible for a court to strike down a law based on its sweeping
Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (holding a Connecticut liquor
pricing scheme unconstitutional due to extraterritorial reach); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (striking a New York milk pricing statute that eliminated
competitive advantage of milk distributors in Vermont); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (invalidating a New York liquor
pricing scheme).
' E.g., Cotto Waxo v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding genuine
issues of material fact existed as to the burdens and benefits under the Pike balancing
test).
79 Meyer, 63 F.3d at 659.
0 Id. at 661.
" Though some courts consider extraterritoriality in this analysis, whether the
concept is properly considered a part of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is in dis-
pute. In his essay, Regan notes that:
[T]he absence of a specific textual prohibition on extraterritorial legislation
means that one may be tempted, when one is considering an extraterritorial
law that is also a regulation of interstate commerce, to say that the com-
merce clause prohibits extraterritoriality. But this analysis would be mere
window dressing, and misleading. The principle involved is not essentially
a commerce clause principle at all.
Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1280 (1986).
" 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
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extraterritorial effect under strict scrutiny, 83 courts can now look to
the heightened level of scrutiny if the statute does not have patently
extraterritorial attributes. A court can examine a statute, find that it
merely has the "practical effect" of extraterritorial control, and strike
it down after summarily finding that the state has adequate and less-
restrictive alternatives.
In Meyer, the court noted that other circuit courts have inter-
preted the extraterritoriality concept differently. 4 In Cotto Waxo
Co. v. Williams,5 the Eighth Circuit considered the issue of extra-
territoriality separately from the direct regulation and discrimination
issues. It noted that a statute with extraterritorial effect would be per
se invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause, without regard to
any other inquiry. 6 The Meyer court did not use the concept in
that manner. It instead tied it to the practical effect and discrimina-
tion issues to invalidate the statute.87
In a footnote, the Meyer court explained that since it found that
Wisconsin "can proffer no sufficiently important reason for the
statute," and that the extraterritorial nature of the statute gave it the
practical effect of regulating interstate commerce, it did not have to
reach the issue of whether extraterritoriality was a distinct issue.8
Thus, the court recognized that other courts have used extraterrito-
riality as a basis for invalidating statutes under strict scrutiny. 9 It
"3 Egdar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
'4
The Eight Circuit treated the issue of whether a state statute had an "ex-
traterritorial reach" as a separate issue from whether the statute discriminat-
ed against interstate commerce. . . .We have no need to determine wheth-
er the issue of extraterritorial reach ought to be analyzed distinctly from
the issue of discrimination against interstate commerce ...
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 662 n. 10 (7th Cir.
1995).
" Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1995). In Coto Waxo the
Eighth Circuit in fact held that the individual statute at issue in the case did not have
extraterritorial reach such that it violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The court
remanded the case for further findings of fact under the Pike balancing test.
6 "It may also be correct to say that "extraterritorial reach" is a special example
of "directly" regulating interstate commerce .. we analyze the extraterritorial reach
cases separately for purposes of simplicity . Id. at 793.
" "The practical effect of the Wisconsin legislation is to impose the requirements
of Wisconsin law on numerous waste generators who neither reside, nor dispose of their
waste in Wisconsin . . . " Meyer, 63 F.3d at 661.
Id. at 662.
the Court will not hesitate to strike down a state law shown to have
extraterritorial scope and an adverse impact on commerce occurring wholly outside the
enacting state." Id. at 658.
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nevertheless used the concept in a different way, evaluating it under
heightened scrutiny, and while disavowing use of the concept as a
"distinct issue," created another judicial weapon against state envi-
ronmental regulation.
The implications of this new weapon are two-fold. First, it
shows that courts often confuse language to create new obstacles to
regulation for states under the Commerce Clause.' Even states
with seemingly legitimate interests have regulations based on those
interests dismissed by courts who use and develop those new weap-
ons. The result is that new and often innovative attempts to regulate
important issues such as the environment are summarily rejected or,
as the Court would say, "struck down ... without further inqui-
ry. 1
9
Secondly, the Seventh Circuit's inteipretation of the extraterri-
toriality concept expands the scope of the dormant Commerce
Clause. It seems that the concept was first introduced to prohibit
states from legislating for other states.92 The concept of extraterri-
toriality under Meyer is very different. It now says that any law
which has any practical extraterritorial effect also has the practical
effect of regulating interstate commerce. It is not difficult to imag-
ine laws that will fall under such an analysis. Should a law that
simply has a practical extraterritorial effect be deemed also to prac-
tically regulate interstate commerce? Putting the merits of
Wisconsin's law aside, it seems that such a standard would be much
too inclusive and subject a high number of regulatory schemes to
Commerce Clause analysis. In an effort to be cautious93, the Sev-
enth Circuit seems to have taken the extraterritorial effects concept
somewhat too far in Meyer.
' See Regan, supra note 81.
9' Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579 (1986).
See Regan, supra note 81.
States are forbidden to legislate extraterritorially whether or not the regu-
lation is a regulation of commerce . . . the Court has located the prohi-
bition on extraterritorial state action in the due process clause." Presumably
then, extraterritoriality involves a much different analysis than that which
courts afford it under the dormant Commerce Clause.
" See supra note 60.
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C. Is Protecting the Environment Considered a Legitimate State
Interest Under Meyer?
Many Commerce Clause inquiries focus on whether the state
has a legitimate local interest in protecting and regulating a given
area.94 The U.S. Supreme Court has often guarded against state
interference with interstate commerce, specifically regarding eco-
nomic isolationism and protectionism.95 Nevertheless, the Court has
recognized that "burdens on interstate commerce may be unavoid-
able when a state legislates to safeguard the health and safety of its
people." Commerce Clause issues often turn on whether legisla-
tion actually serves legitimate local interests, or whether it is really
economic protectionism in disguise.97
Meyer helps to point out that it is unclear whether environmen-
tal concerns are truly considered a legitimate local interest by courts
who undertake Commerce Clause analyses. Arguably, environmental
issues address health and safety concerns, especially regarding dis-
posal of hazardous and medical wastes.98 One can question whether
courts, such as the Seventh Circuit in Meyer, actually afford other,
less safety-oriented environmental concerns much weight in the
analysis.
The U.S. Supreme Court has given lip service to the proposi-
tion that environmental protection is considered a legitimate state
interest. In Clover Leaf Creamery, the Court noted that "[w]hen
94 See supra, note 51, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
9 See Regan, supra.
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
'7 See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S.Ct. 2205, 2211 (1994)
(holding that "[the] 'negative' aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic pro-
tectionism- that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests
by burdening out-of-state competitors... ") (quoting New Energy Co. of Indiana v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S.Ct. 848, 853
(1996) (citing the same case for the same proposition); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) (holding that "[i]f a state law purporting to
promote environmental purposes is in reality 'simple economic protectionism,' we have
applied a 'virtually per se rule of invalidity."') (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality of
Oregon, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 1349 (1994) (noting that the framers' purpose for including the
Commerce Clause in the Constitution was to prevent "economic Balkanization" among
the states); Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788, 797 (3d Cir.
1995) (holding that regulations serving protectionist purposes are a fortiori illegitimate).
9' See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 340-41 (1992) (in
which the Court stated that it would "assume New Jersey has every right to protect its
residents' pocketbooks as well as their environment" when evaluating an ordinance
intended to reduce the flow of hazardous wastes into that state).
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legislating in areas of legitimate local concern, such as environmen-
tal protection and resource conservation, states are nonetheless limit-
ed by the Commerce Clause." Therefore, it seems that the envi-
ronment could be considered a legitimate state interest when courts
consider its regulation under the balancing test. Theoretically, given
the right "interest" and the right plan, the above hypothesis would
be true even though the plan had some effect on interstate com-
merce.
Implicit in the entire Meyer opinion is the assumption that
Wisconsin's plan was economic protectionism in disguise. In fact,
from the outset of its opinion the court regarded this statute as "state
economic regulation under the Commerce Clause."'" Undoubted-
ly, courts often have difficultly divorcing legitimate topics of con-
cem from the economy. Similarly, in this instance Wisconsin's
scheme would have had an effect on commerce and business. But is
Wisconsin's plan in this case really economic protectionism?
In Meyer, the court attempted to answer the above question
itself. The court recognized Wisconsin's intention in enacting the
statute when it noted that "[o]ver the last decade, fewer and fewer
solid waste landfills have remained available in Wisconsin to dis-
pose of a steadily increasing amount of waste. In response to this
situation, Wisconsin enacted legislation designed to manage the flow
of solid waste into its landfills."'' Therefore, the court recognized
that Wisconsin had environmental concerns in mind when it enacted
the legislation. Given its willingness to invalidate the law on several
Commerce Clause grounds, clearly the court did not consider those
concerns to be legitimate.
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit relied heavily on various
Commerce Clause cases that did not involve environmental con-
cers. In particular it relied on Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Auth.' °2 , Healy v. Beer Institute"°3, and Ed-
gar v. MITE Corp."°4 As noted earlier, those cases involved two
states' attempts to regulate liquor sales and another state's attempt
" Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) (emphasis
added).
'00 National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir.
1995).
103 Id. at 654.
" 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
03 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
'04 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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to regulate corporate takeover bidding, respectively."° Noting that
those cases have little to do with Wisconsin's environmental
scheme, the court argued that it did not matter: "Although cases
like... Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. involved price affirmation
statutes, the principles set forth in these decisions are not limited to
that context."'" Much of the court's decision was thus based on
price control and other economic Commerce Clause precedent.
Arguably, the "context" the court referred to was that of com-
merce. There is little doubt that Wisconsin's scheme involves com-
merce0 7, and that many of the same Commerce Clause principles
should apply. But the court made clear in this case that environ-
mental regulation stands on equal footing with simple economic
price control schemes. At least in this court's opinion, the environ-
ment is not any more of a "legitimate" state interest than controlling
liquor prices. Thus, although many courts speak to environmental
issues as if states have a legitimate right to protect themir ° , often
they are not afforded much legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
In National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer,
we see Wisconsin's aggressive attempt to control the flow of solid
waste over its borders fall to the dormant Commerce Clause. The
statute banned trash containing eleven items from its landfills. The
ban did not apply to any region, whether inside or outside of the
state, deemed to have an "effective recycling program" by the Wis-
consin Department of Natural Resources.
Although this case is generally consistent with a long line of
Commerce Clause precedent, it is important for several reasons. Its
consistency is not be to taken lightly; the only conclusion to be
drawn is that case law about the Commerce Clause is amorphous at
best. The Seventh Circuit followed the two-tiered approach espoused
in many other cases, but also used the confusing third tier, and in
doing so the court exemplified the tendency that many courts have,
which is to use a battery of language to defeat states' attempts to
,03 See supra notes 42, 77.
,0 National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 659 (7th Cir.
1995).
0" Fort Gratoit Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources,
504 U.S. 353 (1992) (holding that although solid waste has no value per se, it is an
article of interstate commerce).
,"s See supra notes 98, 99 and accompanying text.
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regulate legitimate concerns. The court also took another step: it
held that a practical extraterritorial effect equals practical regulation
in interstate commerce. It did so by recognizing that other circuit
courts have used extraterritoriality in relation to strict scrutiny, and
essentially created another weapon under the rubric of heightened
scrutiny. Now, courts will be able to use seemingly insignificant
extraterritorial effects against states with legitimate local concerns.
Significantly, in Meyer the court did not stop with its strict and
heightened scrutiny analyses; it went on and sealed the state's fate
by conclusively deciding the issue under all of the tests available to
it. Most importantly, in doing so the court made it clear that envi-
ronmental regulation is no more legitimate than purely economic
interests, and that the state has no more right to regulate in those
matters than in any other.
In a day of growing concern for the environment and the need
for states to rethink their waste disposal outlooks, courts should give
deference to states with true environmental concerns. Various other
areas of regulation are afforded special protection when subject to
Commerce Clause analysis."° We must rethink our analysis of
state attempts to gain control of their precious natural resources. The
Government must be more lenient toward state environmental regu-
lation, and the most plausible way to do so would be to apply the
Pike balancing test to those schemes that are true attempts to protect
the environment. Further, under Pike, courts should afford environ-
mental concerns the proper amount of legitimacy and proper weight
when balancing them against the burdens that they present to inter-
state commerce. If courts approached Commerce Clause issues with
such an attitude, states would truly be able to strike a balance in this
area.
" For example, states are often allowed more leeway in regulating the importation
and sale of liquor within their boundaries pursuant to the 21st amendment. Though that
is true, the Court has begun to limit that ability with the extraterritoriality doctrine. See
Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 342 (1989).
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